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THE ILLUSION OF IMPORTANCE: RECONSIDERING THE UKS
TAKEOVER DEFENCE PROHIBITION
DAVID KERSHAW*
Abstract This article considers the significance of the UK Takeover Codes
non-frustration prohibition. It asks to what extent the prohibition actually
prevents post-bid, director-controlled defences that would not have been, in
any event, either formally prohibited by UK company law without share-
holder approval or practically ineffective as a result of the basic UK company
law rule set. It finds that there would be minimal scope for director-deployed
defences in the absence of the non-frustration prohibition, and that, in the
context of UK company law, such defences have limited scope to be
deployed for entrenchment purposes. Furthermore, this minimal scope for
board defensive action would, in order to be compliant with a directors
duties, require a pre-bid, shareholder-approved alteration to the UKs default
constitutional balance of power between the board and the shareholder body
to allow corporate powers to be used for defensive effect. In light of this
conclusion the article looks for a rationale to justify denying shareholders the
right to make this limited and potentially beneficial defensive election. It
concludes that no persuasive rationale is available and that the prohibition is
unnecessary and without justification.
I. INTRODUCTION
General Principle 31 together with Rule 212 of the United Kingdoms
Takeover Code3 circumscribe the types of unilateral action that a listed
companys board of directors may take when subject to, or about to be subject
to,4 an unsolicited takeover bid. The principle set forth in General Principle 3
* London School of Economics and Political Science. I would like to thanks Marlies Braun,
Brett Carron and Alison Kershaw for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 General Principle 3 provides that the board of an offeree company must act in the interests
of the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide
on the merits of the bid Takeover Code (2006), B1.
2 Rule 21.1(a) now sets forth the general non-frustration prohibition previously contained in
the General Principle 7 of the previous edition of the Takeover Code. Rule 21.1(b) sets forth
specific prohibitions, for example, on the issue of authorized but unissued shares without share-
holder approval (Takeover Code (2006) I 14).
3 The eighth edition of the Takeover Code was published on 20 May 2006
<http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/codesars/DATA/code.pdf>.
4 The non-frustration prohibition applies where an offer has been made but also where the
company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent. For simplicitys sake
this article uses the term bid to cover both actual and such imminent offers. This prohibition does
not extend to defences put in place prior to any bid having been made.
[ICLQ vol 56, April 2007 pp 267308] doi: 10.1093/iclq/lei165
and Rule 21 is known as the non-frustration principle and effectively limits
post-bid defensive board action to persuading shareholders to reject the bid,
lobbying regulatory competition authorities and searching for a more
favourable suitor, known colloquially as a white knight.5
This regulatory approach to takeover defences is the distinctive centrepiece
of the Takeover Code and is viewed by many as the model for takeover
defence regulation.6 There is considerable support in UK academic, practi-
tioner, and business circles for the non-frustration principle.7 The failure of the
European Unions Takeover Directive to require that all Member States imple-
ment a non-frustration approach was greeted with disquiet in these circles.8
Support for the principle is premised on several familiar rationales. First,
shareholder sovereignty: shareholders should be able to decide whether or not
to sell their shares. Paternalistic concerns about uninformed apathetic share-
holders are misplaced in a bid context: collective action problems are less
acute as individual shareholders have strong incentives to determine whether
the offer price is appropriate. Second, the non-frustration principle ensures an
active market for corporate control which reduces the scope for management
to act in their own interests even prior to a bid and facilitates the replacement
of inefficient or incompetent management. Third, a prohibition on defences
controls the acute agency cost problem generated by the bid itself: the
managers of a company subject to a bid are exposed to loss of office and
accompanying benefits of control and may, therefore, deploy defences to
protect their own interests and not for any value-enhancing purpose. Fourth,
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5 P Davies, The Regulation of Defensive Tactics in the United Kingdom and the United
States in KJ Hopt and E Wynmeersch (eds), European Takeovers: Law and Practice
(Butterworths, London, 1992) 200.
6 See High Level Group of Company Law Experts Report on Issues Relating to Takeover Bids
(2000) (the Winter Report) (the report was requested by the European Commission), rejecting any
scope for the board to take defensive measures. See also T Baums and KE Scott, Taking
Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany
(2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 31, 74.
7 See, eg, TI Ogowewo, Rationalising General Principle 7 of the City Code (1997) 1 Company
Financial and Insolvency Law Review 74, 80, arguing that it is fundamental to the efficient work-
ing of the market for corporate control that shareholders should be able to sell their shares without
management frustrating action; Ben Pettet notes that takeover defences in the UK are heavily
circumscribed by what seems to be a prevailing attitude among city institutions and business that
hostile bids are beneficial and even if not actually encouraged, they should not be stifled (B Pettet,
Company Law (2nd edn, Longman, Harlow, 2005) 398); Company Law Committee of the Law
Society, Response to the Department of Trade and Industry Consultation Document (Apr 1996) on
a proposal for a Thirteenth directive on Company Law concerning takeover bids (memorandum
series no 329, June 1996) paras 1.5 and 9.3; J Plender, Europe Feels the Toxic Effect of Corporate
Nationalism Financial Times (London, 6 Apr 2006) referring to US takeover regulation as highly
toxic compared to the UK approach which enables a control market which is fair to shareholders.
8 M Gatti, Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive
(2005) 6 European Business Organization Law Review 553, 561 notes that if we analyze the
main reason why the [Directive on Takeover Bids] created so much dissatisfaction among the
experts, we observe that its political failure is ascribed to the fact that the board neutrality rule is
not binding. See also D Dombey, EU reaches takeover code compromise Financial Times
(London, 28 Nov 2003) 1; Editorial, Concerns about the Lamfalussy approach: but EU member
states are to blame for weak financial laws Financial Times (London, 1 Dec 2003) 18.
defences can get in the way of efficient combinations that generate synergies
and reduce the cost of production. Consider, for example, the comments of the
High Level Group of Company Law Experts established by the European
Commission to look at takeover regulation in 2001 who concluded that:
Any regime which confers discretion on a board to impede or facilitate a bid
inevitably involves unacceptable cost and riskdefensive mechanisms are often
costly in themselves, apart from the fact that they deny the bidder the opportu-
nity to create wealth by exploiting synergies after a successful bid. Most impor-
tantly management are faced with a significant conflict of interests if a takeover
bid is made ... their interest is in saving their jobs and reputation instead of
maximising the value of the company for shareholders. Their claims to represent
the interests of shareholders or other stakeholders are likely to be tainted by self-
interest. Shareholders should be able to decide for themselves (emphasis added).9
This consensus about the value of the non-frustration principle and the
destructive potential of takeover defences contrasts sharply with the parame-
ters of the takeover defence debate amongst scholars, practitioners and busi-
ness persons in the United States. Under the corporate law of most US states,
takeover defences which provide management with considerable discretion to
resist if not unequivocally prohibit a bid are lawful and commonplace.10 The
primary initial response by corporate law scholars to the deployment and court
approval of takeover defences in the 1980s was to view these defences through
the lens of managerial self-interest.11 This academic consensus contrasted
with a practitioner consensus that viewed takeover defences as a mechanism
for protecting shareholder value and other stakeholders by protecting the
companys longer term strategic interests.12 The US academic consensus has,
however, changed radically since these earlier encounters. The contemporary
US debate takes place within the narrow parameters of a general acceptance
that takeover defences should be available and that their availability poten-
tially benefits shareholder value. Within these parameters a strident debate
takes place about the extent to which the board should be shielded from effec-
tive court review of the deployment of these defences and about the amount of
time a board should be able to resist a bidders advances. Today in the United
States a regime based upon Rule 21 would attract few proponents, even
amongst those who are seen as academic champions of shareholder rights.13
The UKs Takeover Defence Prohibition 269
9 Winter Report (n 6) 21.
10 See, eg, Unitrin v American General Corp 651 A.2d 1361 (Delaware, 1995).
11 See, eg, FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1991) noting at 162 that resistance is the phenomenon of interest.
12 See, eg, M Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism (1987) 136
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1 (Martin Lipton is a Senior Partner at Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen, and Katz and creator of the poison pill which is discussed at n 23 below).
13 See, eg, L Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers (2002) 69 The
University of Chicago Law Review 973, 1027, arguing against board veto but accepting that a
poison pill should remain in place for a period reasonably sufficient for . . . exploring and
preparing alternatives for shareholder consideration.
There are two central insights that have transformed the US debate. The
first is that although takeover defences may be used to entrench management
they also have several potentially positive functions, depending on defence
type. First, they facilitate an undistorted shareholder vote on the proposed
transaction.14 Secondly, once the company is placed in play they allow the
board to determine a sale strategy and control the sale process: a controlled
sale process is likely to result in a higher premium than an uncontrolled
auction.15 Thirdly, related to this, they give the board more time to identify
other potential value-enhancing restructuring or third party purchaser options.
Fourthly, they can prevent uninformed and uninformable shareholders from
selling their shares for less than they are worth.16 Fifthly, they give the board
greater bargaining power which may, depending on the particular circum-
stances, enable them to obtain a price that exceeds the boards reservation
price and to extract a greater share of any deal synergies.
The second insight is that the effectiveness of any tailored takeover
defence, with regard to both its ability to entrench management as well as the
positive functions outlined above, is dependent upon the background set of
very basic corporate law rules and the extent to which those basic corporate
law rules are default or mandatory rules. These basic rules include: rules
governing the appointment and removal of the board of directors; the amend-
ment of constitutional documents; the calling of shareholder meetings; and
agenda-setting for any such meetings. The functional effectiveness of a
takeover defence depends on its interaction with these basic rules. The appar-
ently potent potential of a takeover defence in one rule setting could be emas-
culated by a different set of background rules. A different rule setting could
disable any entrenchment functionality but maintain a defences effectiveness
as a delay or sale-control mechanism.
This article is an inquiry into how these insights affect our understanding
of the significance of and the justification for the UKs non-frustration prohi-
bition. This inquiry requires that we posit a UK legal world without Rule 21.17
The article asks: what would be the scope for directors to deploy, and for what
purposes could they deploy, takeover defences once the bid has been made if
there were no Rule 21 prohibition? Using the board controlled18 takeover
defences found in the United States as a hypothetically complete control set of
270 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
14 ibid 981. See also n 133.
15 M Kahan and EB Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as
Precommitment (2003) 152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 473, 477 arguing that this
effect of takeover defences has not been properly emphasized in the takeover literature.
16 Unitrin v American General Corp (n 10).
17 This contrasts with much of the existing scholarship on Rule 21 that has looked at the avail-
ability of pre-bid defences that do not require any post-bid board action such as multiple voting
rights structures and placing shares with a friendly third party prior to any bid. See, eg, P Davies
(n 5).
18 Board controlled is used here to refer to both defences which give the board a discretion
to apply them or to lift them once the bid has been made (whether put in place pre-or post bid) as
well as to defences that involve post-bid corporate action that has a defensive effect.
defence types, the article considers the formal availability of such takeover
defences in the UK, their compliance with UK directors duties and, to the
extent that they are formally available and duty-compliant, their functional
effectiveness when considered together with UK company laws background
rule set.
The article argues that without Rule 21 the scope for post-bid defensive
action by the board would be minimal. All mechanisms designed by US
companies purely for defensive purposes19 which enable the board to control
the defence during the bid would either be unavailable or practically ineffec-
tive. Even without Rule 21 any post-bid corporate action intended to have a
defensive effect requires either specific contemporaneous approval or pre-bid
adjustment to the constitutional balance of power between the board and
shareholders, to authorize corporate powers to be used for defensive purposes.
Furthermore, the article argues that when made available to the board the
scope to exploit this minimal defensive discretion for entrenchment rather than
value-enhancing purposes is constrained by UK company laws basic manda-
tory rules and is much more limited than in the United States. Accordingly,
Rule 21 denies UK shareholders the opportunity to elect to exploit aspects of
the positive functionality of takeover defences (from a shareholder value
perspective) but it does not protect them from the negative entrenchment
effects of available takeover defences as these effects are neutralized in any
event. In light of these conclusions the final part of the article considers
whether a persuasive rationale for Rule 21s continued existence can be artic-
ulated. The article submits that UK regulators and proponents of Rule 21 have
failed to articulate a plausible rationale.
II. TAKEOVER DEFENCES IN THE ABSENCE OF THE NON-FRUSTRATION
PROHIBITION
In contrast to the UKs prohibition on post-bid defensive action by the board,
US state corporations laws provide both generally applicable board-controlled
takeover defences, which companies may opt-out of, and permit the use of
company-specific, board-controlled takeover defences. In Delaware, for exam-
ple, the Delaware General Corporation Law provides a statutory takeover
defence in the form of its Business Combination Statute (discussed in detail
below) and the Delaware courts have permitted companies to develop and
deploy takeover defences post-bid provided that they are proportionate to the
threat which the bid poses to corporate policy and effectiveness.20 This defen-
sive freedom has resulted in a range of creative defences devised by companies
legal and business advisors. Within the confines of the proportionality
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19 eg poison pills or business combination statutes. See text to nn 2336.
20 Unocol Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A2.d 946 (Delaware, 1985).
constraint,21 the US experience of defensive measures provides us with a
useful and arguably complete control set of board-controlled defence types.
This section outlines the primary US board-controlled defence types and
asks to what extent they would be available and/or practically effective in a
UK legal environment that did not contain the Takeover Codes non-frustra-
tion prohibition. The section addresses this question in three parts. First, it
describes the takeover defence types and considers their formal availability;
that is, does UK company law offer the tools necessary to put such defences
in place? Secondly, it asks whether the use of the formally available defences
is compatible with directors duties owed to the company? Thirdly, it asks
whether, even if defences are formally available and compliant with directors
duties, the context of UK company laws basic rule set enables or strips them
of their effectiveness in practice. Effective takeover defences (ETDs) are those
defences that combine all three of these factors: they are formally available,
duty-compliant and effective in practice.
A. US Defence Types and their Theoretical UK Availability
There are five takeover defence types22 in the United States which locate the
power to exercise the defence following a bid at board level: first, defences put
in place through the creative use of options to purchase the companys equity
which are issued to existing shareholders; second, business combination
defences provided either by the state corporation code or set forth in the
companys constitutional documents; third, the restructuring of the companys
equity and debt; fourth, the defensive effect of business decisions taken
outside of the ordinary course of business; and fifth, tactical litigation
designed to forestall or stop a takeover bid.
1. Shareholder rights plans: poison pills
The most important type of board-controlled US takeover defence is a share-
holder rights plan. This defence involves warrants issued by the target
company to existing shareholders to purchase equity in the target company
(flip-in plan) or in the bidder should a successful bidder merge with the target
(flip-over plan).23 These are the infamous poison pill24 defences. They are put
272 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
21 The proportionality constraint was significantly relaxed post-Unocal following the Delaware
Supreme Courts decisions in Paramount Communications, Inc v Time Incorporated 571 A.2d
1140 (Delaware, 1990) and Unitrin v American General Corp (n 10).
22 This section does not set forth an exclusive list of possible defences, only those that involve
post-bid board action without shareholder approval; that is, those defences caught by Rule 21.
23 For a more detailed explanation of flip-in and flip over pills as well as a review of the initial
approval of these devices by the Delaware Courts see JP Lowry, Poison Pills in US
CorporationsA Re-Examination [May 1992] Journal of Business Law 337.
24 The term poison pill is sometimes used in UK debates as a general term for takeover
defences, see, B Clarke, Regulating Poison Pill Devices (2004) 4 Journal of Corporate Law
in place without shareholder approval by the issuance of the warrants as an
interim dividend. The rights attached to these warrants are set forth in a share-
holder rights plan adopted by the board. The warrants are attached to the
shares and transferred with the shares prior to a triggering event. The warrants
have no economic value until triggered by a hostile bidder. If such a bidder
crosses a specified ownership threshold, which is typically between 10 and 20
per cent of the targets outstanding voting shares, without obtaining target
board approval then the warrants give the existing shareholders (excluding the
bidder) the right to purchase voting equity at, usually, a 50 per cent discount.
The effect of the pill if triggered is to significantly dilute the bidders existing
shareholding in the target (flip-in plan) or the shareholders of the bidder itself
following a subsequent merger (flip-over plan), resulting in a substantial trans-
fer in value to existing target shareholders. Accordingly, no bidder would ever,
and has ever, swallowed a pill. The shareholder rights plan provides that the
board has the right to redeem the warrants. Until the board does so the tender
offer will not be able to proceed. Importantly, in most US states a pill can be
adopted at any time without the requirement to obtain shareholder approval
even after a bidder has announced its intention to commence a tender offer.25
Variations on the redemption provisions, that are not valid in all states, include
provisions that prevent redemption for a time period following the announce-
ment of the bid (a no-hand pill) and continuing director provisions that allow
only the board members that held office at the time the pill was adopted to
redeem the pill (dead-hand pill).26
In the UK Rule 21 would not prevent putting a poison pill into place prior
to any bid.27 However, following the announcement of the bid and the bidders
request to redeem the pill, the boards refusal to redeem a pill would violate
Rule 21 as it would amount to action that would frustrate the bid and prevent
the shareholders from deciding on the merits of the offer. In theory, a pill
could be put in place that has no board redemption provision, which would,
therefore, require no action on the part of the board. However, it is highly
unlikely that any company would attempt to put in place such a pill as it would
deter any friendly bid if all shareholders could not be persuaded to relinquish
the warrants.28
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Studies 51. This article adopts the US approach to this terminology where poison pill is used
exclusively to refer to shareholder rights plans.
25 Unitrin v American General Corp (n 10).
26 No-hand and dead-hand pills are not permitted in Delaware (see Carmody v Toll Brothers,
Inc 723 A.2d 1180 (Delaware, 1998) and Quickturn Design Sys, Inc v Shapiro 721 A.2d 1281
(Delaware, 1998)), however, dead-hand pills have been approved in Georgia (Invacare Corp v
Healthdyne Tech 968 F Supp 1678 (ND Georgia, 1997)) and no-hand pills have been approved in
Pennsylvania (AMP v Allied Signal No 98-4405 LEXIS 15617 (Pennsylvania, 1998)).
27 See G Barboutis, Takeover Defence Tactics II: Specific Defensive Devices (1999) 20
Company Lawyer 40, discussing the availability of pills in the UK prior to a bid.
28 cf Criterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2002] EWCA Civ 1783.
In the absence of the Rule 21 prohibition, poison pills would be theoreti-
cally possible under UK company law. Boards of directors of public compa-
nies are usually authorized to make interim dividends.29 A warrant could be
issued to all shareholders of the company as an interim dividend. As with a US
poison pill, the rights attached to those warrants would be set forth in a share-
holder rights plan. However, in order to issue such warrants the shareholders
in a general meeting would have to provide the board with authority to allot
the warrants.30 In contrast to the US, therefore, the pill would only be avail-
able with pre- or post-bid shareholder approval.
An additional problem with regard to its availability arises from the terms
of the United Kingdom Listing Authoritys (UKLA) Listing Principle 5 which
provides that for listed companies holders of the same class of shares be
treated equally in respect of the rights attaching to such shares. Following a
triggering event the bidder would not be able to exercise the right to purchase
shares at a discount. If the bidder was allowed to do so it would vitiate the
defensive impact of the pill as there would be no bidder value-dilution.
Arguably, this discriminates against the bidder. The strong case that a pill does
not amount to a violation of the equal treatment principle would be as follows:
the warrant provides a contingent right which is applicable to all shareholders
equally; should a bidder-shareholder not comply with the conditions of that
warrant it would not be exercisable; the inability of the bidder to exercise any
warrant rights stems not from shareholder rights discrimination but from the
bidders own failure to comply with the warrants conditionality. However, if
the UKLA rejected this argument and viewed these devices as discriminatory
they would be unavailable to UK listed companies.
2. Business combination defences
A business combination defence places limitations on the ability of a success-
ful bidder to combine with the target company, through a merger or any type
of asset disposition or lease, for a specified period following the completion of
the tender offer if the bidder crosses a share ownership threshold without the
approval of the incumbent board. Such a restriction inhibits a successful
bidder from integrating and restructuring the target company and delays the
realization of any expected synergies. For example, section 203 of the
Delaware General Corporation Code provides for a threshold of 15 per cent of
the outstanding voting stock of the corporation and for a three-year bar on any
business combination.31 Post-completion, these restrictions may be waived
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29 Table A provides for interim dividends in Art 103.
30 Section 80 of the Companies Act 1985 requires that the board is authorized by the share-
holder to body to allot relevant securities, which are defined in s 80(2) to include any right to
subscribe for, or to convert into any security into, shares of the company (ss 54951 CA 2006).
31 This restriction is inapplicable if following the completion of the transaction in which the
bidder crosses the 15 per cent threshold the bidder owns 85 per cent of the disinterested outstand-
ing voting stock of the company s 203(a)(2) DGCL.
only with board approval and the approval of two-thirds of the disinterested
shareholders.32 As prior management may form a substantial block of the
remaining shareholders this post-purchase approval may be unavailable.
Furthermore, the inability to merge the target with the bidder or one of its
subsidiaries prevents the bidder from squeezing out management ownership
either through a short form or a long form merger.33 No other compulsory
purchase mechanism is provided by Delaware law.
Variations on the business combination defence are common in many
public company constitutional documents, whether or not the applicable
corporation law provides for such defences. The important difference between
statutory business combination defences as compared to similar defences that
can be set forth in a companys constitutional documents is that shareholder
approval is not required to put them in place. The default position is their
application. To disapply them the company must amend its constitutional
documents to opt out. Opting out, however, is no longer an option once the
business combination provision has been triggered.34
In the UK there is no reason why such restrictions could not be placed in
the constitutional documents at the IPO stage or, with shareholder approval, at
any time prior to any takeover bid. Such provisions would prevent any post-
completion asset sale or any merger or consolidation pursuant to a scheme of
arrangement.35 Rule 21 does not prevent the shareholders from amending the
constitution to include such a provision. It would, however, prevent the board
from refusing to disapply the business combination provision to a specific
bidder, as such a refusal would deny the shareholders the opportunity to
decide on the merits of the bid36 as a bidder would be unlikely to proceed
until the defence is raised.
3. Restructuring defences
The third type of board-controlled defence is the restructuring defence, which
generally involves both a distribution to shareholders through an extraordinary
dividend or share buy-back coupled with, and often funded by, either a place-
ment of a block of shares with a friendly third party or a substantial increase
in the companys leverage. The restructuring response is likely to depend on
the nature of the bidder. A highly leveraged bidder, such as a private equity
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32 Section 203(a)(3) DGCL.
33 A short-form merger takes place where a parent that owns at least 90 per cent of the voting
shares of a subsidiary merges with that subsidiary (s 253 DGCL). All other mergers are long-form
mergers (s 251 DGCL).
34 Section 203(b)(3) DGCL.
35 Section 425 CA 1985 (ss 8959 CA 2006). In re Oceanic Steam Navigation Company Limited
[1939] Ch 41, the court held that it could not sanction any arrangement or compromise (under ss 153
and 154 of the Companies Act 1929) which involved a transfer of assets where the memorandum
did not include a power to sell or dispose of the whole or any part of the undertaking.
36 General Principle 3 and Rule 21.1(a) Takeover Code (2006).
bidder, will require the targets free cash flow to finance its own debt.37 If
prior to the completion of the bid the targets leverage substantially increases
then free cash flow will be inadequate and a bid impossible. However, if the
bidder is an industrial cash or equity bidder which would not be deterred by
the additional leverage, the restructuring is likely to focus on preventing the
bidder from obtaining effective control. The recent proposed defensive
response by the Luxembourg-based steel company Arcelor following the
hostile approach made by Mittal Steel is a simple example of the latter type of
restructuring. The defensive proposal involved issuing shares to a friendly
third party, Severstal, amounting to 32 per cent of the companys outstanding
shares. The company also proposed to effect a share buy-back which would
have increased Severstals stake in the company to 38 per cent.38 An equity
restructuring defence is dependent on the companys ability to find and to be
permitted to make an issue of shares to a friendly third party. A debt restruc-
turing defence is dependent on the company being sufficiently cash rich to
service a substantial increase in debt and being permitted to make a very large
distribution.
There is much less scope for carrying out restructuring defences in the UK
than in the United States. Taking Delaware as the US comparator, if the
company has sufficient authorized share capital the board has the power to
issue a substantial block of shares to a friendly third party. No shareholder
approval is required.39 However, if the company is listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and the share issue amounts to more than 20 per cent of the
outstanding voting shares of the company then shareholder approval is
required.40 Corporation statutes do not impose mandatory pre-emption rights
and, although companies may of their own accord provide pre-emption rights,
such provision would be unusual in US publicly traded companies.41
Delaware companies have considerable flexibility to make large interim divi-
dends provided that the company was not insolvent prior to, or as a result of,
the dividend.42 Companies may make dividends out of surplus,43 which could
include capital received for prior issues of shares in excess of the par value of
those shares.44 Nimble dividends out of the most recent years profits may be
made even though the companys cumulative losses exceed its profits.45
276 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
37 Assuming any financial assistance problems can be resolved (Part V, Chapter VI CA 1985;
Part 18 Chapter 2 CA 2006).
38 See Doubts on Arcelors bear-hug strategy now the Luxembourg company faces gover-
nance issues Financial Times (London, 31 May 2006).
39 Section 161 DGCL.
40 New York Stock Exchange Listing Manual, para 312.03(c).
41 B Black and JC Coffee, Britannia: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited
Regulation (1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 1997.
42 Delaware Fraudulent Conveyance Act (Delaware Code, Title 6, subtitle II, Chapter 13, s
1305).
43 DGCL, s 170(a).
44 DGCL, s 154.
45 DGCL, s 170(a).
Directors are authorized to repurchase shares provided that it does not impair
the capital of the company.46 No shareholder approval is required. All repur-
chased shares may be retained as treasury shares unless retired and may be
resold to a third party.
Compare this level of flexibility to the situation facing a UK company
considering a restructuring defence (in the absence of Rule 21).47 UK compa-
nies face considerable restrictions in issuing shares to friendly third parties
without post-bid shareholder approval. Pursuant to current UK law, a board of
directors can only issue shares to a third party if the company has sufficient
authorized share capital, the shareholders have granted authority to allot the
shares48 and, if the shares are issued for cash consideration, the shareholders
have disapplied their statutorily imposed mandatory pre-emption rights.49
Public companies generally seek annual resolutions that grant authority to
allot shares. Such a grant of authority usually specifies the type of share, for
example, ordinary shares, and may be conditional or unconditional.50 Even
assuming a substantial and rolling grant of authority to allot shares,51 it is clear
that institutional shareholders value their pre-emption rights and although they
are willing to grant a waiver of pre-emption rights for issuances of up to 5 per
cent of outstanding shares each year, which should not exceed more than 7.5
per cent in any three-year rolling period, they look dimly upon and will oppose
more extensive waivers.52 Although the recent introduction of treasury shares
may provide some companies with additional flexibility, the pre-emption
regime applies to these shares as well.53 In theory UK boards have some scope
to avoid these restrictions as pre-emption rights are only applicable if the share
issue is for cash only and contains no in-kind consideration.54 Even an
insignificant in-kind component would result in the avoidance of the pre-
emption right regime. However, given that UK institutional investors value
pre-emption rights, any attempt by companies faced with a control threat to
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48 Section 80 CA 1985 (ss 54951 CA 2006). See G Barboutis, Takeover Defence Tactics II:
Specific Defensive Devices (1999) 20 Company Lawyer 40 discussing, amongst others, author-
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50 Section 80(3) CA 1985. (ss 54951CA 2006).
51 See, eg, Vodafone Plc obtained at its AGM in July 2006 authority to allot 9,000,000,000
ordinary shares amounting to 14.9 per cent of the capital of the company.
52 Preemption Group Principles, Principles 8 and 10. See n 164 for further detail.
53 Section 94(3)(A) CA 1985 (s 560(2)(b) CA 2006).
54 Section 89(4) CA 1985 (s 565 CA 2006).
avoid pre-emption rights by combined cash and in-kind consideration would
most likely result in standard conditions being placed upon future grants of
authority to allot shares that would prevent any other non pre-emptive defen-
sive issues.55
On the distribution side, UK regulation is again more restrictive. To be able
to make a substantial interim dividend UK public companies must comply
with the net-profits test which requires that total cumulative realized profits
exceed total cumulative realized losses by the amount of the dividend56 and
the net assets test, which requires that net assets exceed, amongst others, share
capital and any share premium by the amount of the dividend.57 A restructur-
ing defence which involves a substantial distribution will, therefore, only be
available to companies who have a very healthy balance sheet. Any attempt to
alter the balance of control by making the distribution through a share repur-
chase is not as readily available to boards of UK companies as boards are not
authorized to make such repurchases without shareholder approval.58
4. Business decisions with a defensive impact
This category of defence involves business decisions that may have been taken
because of their defensive impact but which can also be characterized as busi-
ness decisions which were taken on the basis of the decisions business merits
rather than its defensive impact. Post-bid this could include the sale of a key
business asset or division, which is colloquially known as a crown jewels
defence, as the bidder would not be interested in the company without this asset.
Post-bid, Rule 21 prohibits the sale or purchase of a material59 amount of
assets60 or entering into any contracts which are not in the ordinary course of
business.61 In the hypothetical absence of the non-frustration principle, the
primary form of regulation of these types of defensive decisions would be
through directors duties, which is discussed in detail below. In addition to
this, a listed company boards freedom to sell all or a substantial stake in one
of the companys important assets or divisions is constrained by the Listing
Rules regulation of Significant Transactions. Pursuant to Listing Rule 10.5, if
the transaction amounts to 25 per cent of the targets gross assets, or the prof-
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its attributable to the assets represent 25 per cent of the profits of the target, or
the consideration is 25 per cent of the targets market capitalization,62 then the
transaction is classified by the Listing Rules as a Class 1 transaction which
must be conditional upon, and cannot be carried out without, shareholder
approval.63 This contrasts with Delaware law where shareholder approval is
required for a disposal only when it amounts to the sale of all or substantially
all of the companys assets.64
5. Litigation
In the United States defensive litigation by the target is a familiar aspect of
contested takeover bids. Litigation is usually based on the bidders failure to
comply with the disclosure obligations set forth in sections 13(d) and 14(d) of
the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 and the rules promulgated thereunder.65
Target companies have commonly been granted private rights of action under
these provisions by US courts.66 In addition, targets sometimes commence
private antitrust litigation under the Clayton Act on the basis that they will
suffer an antitrust injury as a result of the takeover. There is, however,
conflicting authority67 on the extent to which targets have standing to bring
such an action, with more recent authority suggesting that it would be difficult
for targets to obtain standing.68
Commencing litigation in the United States has the potential to serve two
defensive objectives. First, it can create delay in the bid process thereby giving
the board more time to prepare alternative defences or identify other bidders.
Second, it may, depending on the nature of the claim and the merits of the
case, halt the bid altogether. Since the approval of the poison pill in the mid-
1980s69 and clarification that a pill may be put in place after a bid
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64 Section 271(a) DGCL.
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67 See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v Minorco, SA, 871 F.2d 252, 258 (2d Cir, 1989) where
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted standing and Anago Inc v Techno Medical Products
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68 JM Jacobson and T Greer, Twenty-One Years Of Antitrust Injury: Down The Alley With
Brunswick v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat (1998) 66 Antitrust Law Journal 273, 305 noting that most
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Computer Services 907 F Supp 1545 (Delaware, 1995) 1556.
69 Moran v Household International, Inc 500 A2d 1346 (Delaware, 1985).
commences,70 it is unlikely that litigation is used as a delaying device; the pill,
particularly when combined with a staggered board,71 is likely to provide
much more time than a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunc-
tion.72 Furthermore, it is unusual for litigation to act as a show stopper.73 In
relation to disclosure litigation it is more common for the courts to require
corrective disclosure.74 In relation to antitrust litigation, if standing can be
established, which as noted above is uncertain, and the merits of the case are
strong then injunctive relief may temporarily75 or even permanently put a stop
to the tender offer. Such injunctive relief is, however, very rare. Since 1992
when the 5th Circuit of the US Court of Appeals held in Anago Inc v Techno
Medical Products Inc that the target did not have standing, only one case76 has
granted preliminary injunctive relief in relation to an antitrust suit brought by
the target.77
Whereas in the United States the defensive implications of litigation have
been rendered trivial by the ready availability of more powerful defences, to
the extent that such other defences would not be available or are practically
ineffective in the UK, litigation (in the absence of Rule 21) would have the
potential to play a more important defensive role. To what extent would liti-
gation be available to UK targets? The scope for tactical litigation under the
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the predecessor of todays Takeover
Code (2006), was limited as the City Code did not have the force of law.78 As
the Panel performed public law duties, the Panels decisions themselves could
be subject to judicial review. However, in R v Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers, ex parte Datafin79 the Court of Appeal clarified that the courts will
not intervene in the Panels decision during the course of the bid, rather they
will only intervene through declaratory orders providing guidance for future
Panel decision-making. The legalization of the Code through the Companies
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78 For a review of the scope for defensive litigation pre- and post the Takeovers Directive
(Interim Implementation Regulations) 2006 (which were superseded by Part 28 of the CA 2006
Act) see T Ogowewo, op cit. 79 [1987] 2 WLR 699.
Act 200680 has not increased the scope for defensive litigation during the
course of a bid based on Code violations. The Act provides that no person
outside the Panel will be able to apply for injunctive relief81 and that there is
no private law action for breach of statutory duty for contravention of a rule-
based requirement or a disclosure requirement.82
Accordingly, Rule 21 plays no role in inhibiting Code-related litigation. To
what extent, therefore, would there be scope for non-Code-related litigation in
the absence of Rule 21? It was not until the Panels statement in the
Consolidated Gold Fields case,83 where the UK targets US subsidiary
obtained a US preliminary injunction for breach of US antitrust laws, that the
Panel took a position on the implications of such litigation for the non-frus-
tration principle. In this case, having determined that the litigation had a frus-
trating effect, they instructed Consolidated Gold Fields to discontinue the
proceedings or obtain shareholder approval to continue the proceedings. Prior
to this date there were only three cases in which the target brought an action
for injunctive relief to prevent the bid going forward.84 One of these cases,
Cartwright (Holdings) Plc v Newman Tonks Group Plc,85 was unsuccessful
but also Code-related and therefore of no precedential value for contemporary
targets. The other two, Dunford Elliot v Johnston & Firth Brown86 and Marina
Development Group v Local London, related to the use of confidential infor-
mation about the target held by the bidder and resulted in the granting of an
injunction at first instance in Dunford Elliot, which was overruled by the Court
of Appeal, and a temporary suspension of the bid for five days in the case if
Marina Development.87
In the absence of Rule 21, it is submitted that the scope for non-Code-
related defensive litigation would be insignificant. There is no private right of
action under UK competition laws for UK targets. At best, targets would have
the right to seek review of the Office of Fair Tradings (OFT) refusal to refer
a matter to the Competition Commission.88 However, unless the Competition
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Appeal Tribunal rules otherwise, the effect of the original OFT decision is not
suspended by this appeal which would allow the takeover to continue.89
Whilst it is possible that, depending on their US business activities, UK targets
could have resort to a private US antitrust suit, the legality of such suits is open
to doubt and they are almost never successful. In addition, in the rare case
where a bid for a UK company involves dual UK and US offers with the filing
of tender offer disclosure documents under US securities laws,90 there may be
scope for defensive US disclosure litigation which may generate delay and
corrective disclosure. Finally, it may be possible to obtain injunctive relief in
relation to a breach of an obligation owed by the bidder to the target company,
for example, in relation to confidential information. However, the small
number of such cases prior to the Panels 1989 statement suggests that such
cases would be rare.
B. Defences and Directors Duties
1. Improper purpose doctrine: a default constitutional rule of construction
Even if a takeover defence is theoretically available to a UK companys board
of directors, the ability to deploy the defence will be dependent on its compli-
ance with the board of directors duties to the company. Non-compliance
could expose the directors to a suit to force them to withdraw the defence and,
where the company has suffered loss, directors could be required to compen-
sate the company for such loss.91
To what extent are a directors duties compatible with action designed to
deter or delay an unsolicited bid? Directors subject to English law have a fidu-
ciary obligation to act in good faith in the best interests of the company. If
defensive action is used to protect personal benefits of control then directors
are in breach of this fiduciary obligation.92 In the leading cases dealing with
the exercise of corporate power in control contests, the courts have, without
reservation, accepted the bona fides of the directors.93 Nevertheless, good
faith has not been treated as a sufficient condition for legality. English courts
have asked whether the exercise of a corporate power for defensive purposes
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is a legitimate exercise of the corporate power. The applicable doctrine is the
improper purpose doctrine. Most commonly, the scope and operation of this
doctrine is described through a theory about the delegation of powers which is
analogous to the contractual constraints placed on company capacity and
authority to act; the corporate contract delegates to the directors a set of
powers, but they cannot misuse those powers for purposes that are not within
the scope of the delegation.94 In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd
Lord Wilberforce asked whether a fiduciary power has been exercised for the
purpose for which it was conferred and held that although the exercise of
such a power may be formally valid [it] may be attacked on the ground that it
was not exercised for the purpose for which it was granted.95 The codifica-
tion of directors duties set forth in the Companies Act 2006 draws literally on
Lord Wilberforces approach providing that a director of a company must
only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred.96
There are two fundamental problems with this theory of power-specific
delegation in the corporate context. First, in contrast to the drafting of state
constitutions the drafting and formation of a corporate constitution is not the
product of minuted debate about the purpose and intention of specific rules. In
regard to most delegated powers there is no record that can enlighten a discus-
sion about the proper purposes for which a specific power can be used. Indeed,
most companies powers are not the product of debate but of borrowed boiler-
plate, whether in the form of Table A or professionally tailored versions
thereof. At most the intention could be said to provide the company with the
powers it needs to run the business. Secondly, because the future is unpre-
dictable the viability and effectiveness of a corporate contract is dependent on
it being incomplete. No one can predict all the business problems and oppor-
tunities that will face the company in its future and the value-generating
purposes for which the delegated powers may have to be used. Delegated
corporate powers therefore do not contain at any time, at the time they were
granted or at any point thereafter, an immanent, exhaustive list of proper
purposes. Accordingly, any attempt by courts to assess original intent, to
impute or to supplement purposive constraints is misdirected and hopeless.97
The logical dead end of this theory of delegated power-specific proper
purposes is quickly reached in Howard Smith when their Lord Wilberforce
acknowledges that identifying valid purposes clearly cannot be done by
enumeration, since the variety of situations facing directors of different types
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of company in different situations cannot be anticipated.98 Nevertheless, the
logic of the theory of purposive constraints on delegated powers results in the
provision of an opaque and unavoidably unhelpful power-specific rule of
construction/ implied intention:
In their Lordships opinion it is necessary to start with a consideration of the
power whose exercise is in question, in this case a power to issue shares. Having
ascertained, on a fair view, the nature of this power, and having defined as can
best be done in light of modern conditions the, or some, limits within which it
may be exercised, it is then necessary for the court . . . to examine the substan-
tial purpose for which it was exercised.99
The improper purpose doctrine should not be viewed as a rule of construction
in relation to individual powers, designed to access the original or imputed
delegated purposive intent of those powers. It is a doctrine that provides regu-
lation of the balance of power between the board and the shareholder body. As
Professor Davies notes, when Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith comes to
determine the legitimacy of the target boards action, the finding of illegality
is not the result of specific analysis of the purposes for which the targets
power to issue shares could be used but rather it is viewed as a function of the
constitutional arrangements for the distribution of power between the board
and the shareholder body.100 Professor Sealy also argues that the improper
purpose doctrine should be viewed in broad constitutional terms rather than
through the lens of delegated powers; however, he submits that Lord
Wilberforces consideration of company constitutional arrangements was not
part of the ratio of the case.101 With respect, Lord Wilberforces constitutional
observation is inseparable from the holding, whereas the rule of construction/
imputation disappears when the facts of the case are engaged:
the constitution of a limited company normally provides for directors, with
powers of management, and shareholders, with defined voting powers having
power to appoint the directors, and to take, in general meeting, by majority vote,
decisions on matters not reserved for management. Just as it is established that
directors, within their management powers, may take decisions against the
wishes of the majority of shareholders, and indeed that the majority of share-
holders cannot control them in the exercise of their powers while they remain in
office (Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd. v Cunningham), so it
must be unconstitutional for directors to use their fiduciary powers over the
shares in the company purely for the purpose of destroying an existing majority,
or creating a new majority which did not previously exist (emphasis added).102
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Nor does pre-Howard Smith case law view the scope of the doctrine in terms
of the delegated purposes of specific powers, rather the doctrine is viewed in
broader constitutional terms. In Hogg v Cramphorn, Buckley J held that the
courts will not permit directors to exercise powers, which have been dele-
gated to them by the company in circumstances which put the directors in a
fiduciary position when exercising those powers, in such a way as to interfere
with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights.103
In application, therefore, the improper purpose doctrine is not a power-
specific rule of construction; rather, it provides a constitutional rule of
construction to determine the extent to which corporate action taken by the
board alone may interfere with fundamental shareholder rightsthe share-
holder franchise and the right to alienate ones shares.104 The doctrine
provides a default balance of power settlement between the board and share-
holder body. The shareholder body may alter this settlement to the extent of
the available flexibility provided by the statutory regime. In the quote set
forth above, whilst Lord Wilberforce holds that it must be unconstitutional,
which sounds mandatory, this discussion is the product of what the constitu-
tion of a limited company normally provides (emphasis added). Also, whilst
Lord Wilberforce indicates that the powers of the board are fixed through his
reference to Automatic Self-Cleansing,105 it is clear that Automatic Self-
Cleansing and similar cases involve the interpretation of the article delegat-
ing management power to the company. It is equally clear that it is open to
the shareholder body to draft such an article in a way that reserves many
powers, including directing management action, to the shareholder body.106
Accordingly, to the extent that a corporate constitution provides for a differ-
ent balance of power by containing tailored takeover defences or more
broadly authorizing a company to develop and deploy takeover defences pre-
or post-bid in order to deter, delay or frustrate a bid, the improper purpose
doctrine is less likely to invalidate the use of corporate powers as defensive
tools.
It is with regard to the default nature of the improper purpose doctrine that
understanding the doctrine in constitutional rather than individual power terms
becomes important. When viewed in constitutional terms the strict default posi-
tion of the improper purpose doctrine may be dislodged vis-à-vis the exercise
of specific powers, for example, the power to issue shares, by a provision else-
where in the articles or by shareholder action. So, for example, a provision in
the articles or a shareholder resolution providing the company with authority to
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allot warrants in order to put a poison pill in place alters the balance of board
and shareholder power with regard to defensive action in relation to all powers
even though specific powers themselves have not been amended to cover
defensive action. When viewed as a power-specific rule of construction, in
order to dislodge the default position the individual power in question would
have to be modified to enable defensive action, which, as others have noted,
is unlikely in relation to public companies.107
2. The default position
In Hogg v Cramphorn,108 the board of Cramphorn Ltd issued additional shares
to an employee trust formed by the company. As the trustees of the trust were
the managing director of the company, the companys auditor and a company
employee, the share issue to the trust ensured that a likely bidder, if success-
ful, would not be able to command a majority of voting power. The board also
resolved to loan the employee trust the funds to make an offer at the same
price offered by the bidder.109 Buckley J struck down the share issue and the
loan. In relation to the loan, he held that:
It was an integral part of a scheme for securing for the directors the support of a
controlling body of votes. The loan was not made with the single-minded, or
even the primary purpose, of benefiting the company otherwise than by securing
that control of the directors or facilitating their securing that control.110
For Buckley J, corporate powers to issue shares and to make loans could not
be used for the purpose of securing the directors control of the company. The
objective of securing the directors control, however, can cover a wide range
of good and bad faith reasons for securing such control. In Hogg v Cramphorn,
the court held that the directors were acting in good faith and with honourable
intentions. The board claimed that the corporate actions were motivated by
the fact that the offer was inadequate and liable to unsettle the companys
employees upon whom the company was very dependent for its success and
development.111 Buckley Js judgment makes it clear that these reasons are
insufficient to justify such defensive corporate action. However, his judgment
goes further. He suggests that there could not be any reason or justification for
such action. Any belief about why such action would protect and benefit the
company is even if well founded . . . irrelevant.112
In Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, the board of the target company,
RW Miller (Holdings) Ltd, when faced with an offer for its outstanding shares
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from Ampol Petroleum Ltd, who together with Bulkships Ltd owned 55 per
cent of the shares, issued additional shares to Howard Smith Ltd. Although the
board claimed that the purpose of the share issue was to raise finance, the court
found that the shares had been issued to enable a bid for the company by
Howard Smith by reducing the percentage shareholding held by Ampol and
Bulkships to a minority holding. Howard Smith was prepared to make an offer
which exceeded the Ampol offer by 10 per cent. The Privy Council held that
the issue of shares purely for the purpose of creating voting power has repeat-
edly been condemned and that it is unconstitutional for directors to use their
fiduciary powers over the shares in the company purely for the purpose of
destroying an existing majority, or creating a new majority which did not
previously exist113 (emphasis added).
Lord Wilberforces focus on purpose suggests a distinction, later deployed
by their Lordships in the context of financial assistance,114 between purpose
and reason. If the primary objective is to alter the balance of voting power by
converting a majority into a minority then it does not matter why you are doing
this: reason is irrelevant. This contrasts with dicta from the Canadian decision
of Teck Corporation Limited v Miller,115 a decision that rejected the approach
taken in Hogg v Cramphorn.116 In Teck, the board of Afton Mines Ltd entered
into a contract with a third party to develop a copper mine. This type of
contract was known in the industry as the ultimate deal and typically
involved a substantial issue of shares to the counterparty. However, the effect
of this issue was to foreclose a bid for the company from Teck Corp. Berger J
held that:
My own view is that directors ought to be allowed to consider who is seeking
control and why. If they believe that there will be substantial damage to the
company if it is taken over, then the exercise of powers to defeat those seeking a
majority will not necessarily be improper (emphasis added).117
Interestingly, in Howard Smith Lord Wilberforce distinguishes Teck in a way
that suggests some degree of approval.118 This does not, however, suggest that
there is room in Howard Smith for a reason-based analysis of defensive action.
Lord Wilberforce viewed Teck through a non-defensive lens: the company
was attempting to strike the best deal for the company; given industry ulti-
mate deal practice this inevitably involved defeat for Teck if another party
was selected.
More recent cases, however, have provided support for a more flexible
reason-based analysis. Cayne v Global Natural Resources PLC119 involved
the application of the improper purpose doctrine to the legality of a merger
involving a UK PLCs US subsidiary. One of the terms of the merger included
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an issue of shares by the UK company, Global Natural Resources PLC. At the
time of the merger a dissident group of shareholders had launched a proxy
contest to remove the board of directors. In considering the improper purpose
doctrine, Sir Robert Megarry VC noted that the principle set forth in Hogg v
Cramphorn must not be carried too far. In considering whether a hypotheti-
cal company B could issue shares to a third party to ensure that a competitor
and shareholder of company B could not use its shareholding to the detriment
of company B, he noted that he saw no reason why the issue of shares should
not be a perfectly proper exercise of the fiduciary powers of the directors of
company B. The object is not to retain control as such, but to prevent company
B from being reduced to impotence and beggary. Sir Robert Megarry VC,
echoing Berger Js dicta on substantial damage in Teck, recognizes that
behind the mantle of retaining control are legitimate and illegitimate reasons.
He argues that there are defensive reasons that would justify action that purpo-
sively alters voting control. Importantly, the threshold for such justifications
seems to be set very high: Megarry VC refers to avoidance of impotence and
beggary. It is unclear whether this would include only extreme predatory
minority shareholder behaviour or would it also, for example, apply to the
break-up of hostile bids which would result in the post-completion sell-off of
significant company assets? Cayne provides limited guidance on the set of
legitimate reasons, but it does suggest that there are unlikely to be many.
It is also worth noting that the example given by Megarry VC involved the
issue of shares to alter voting power but did not involve the conversion of a
majority voting interest into a minority voting interest. Here we see that there
is a possible regulatory relationship between legitimate reasons for (or ends
of) the action and the means used to achieve those ends. Put alternatively,
there may be more flexibility on reason for action where the infringement on
the shareholder franchise is smaller. This would suggest that the defences and
reasons to deploy defences that do not directly interfere with the franchise may
be viewed more favourably by UK courts. However, Hogg v Cramphorn and
Howard Smith would not support this position. In Hogg v Cramphorn the
bidder had not acquired a majority position when the board acted and the court
also invalidated the loan to an employee trust on the basis that it was a defen-
sive measure to retain control. Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith suggests that
action intended to inhibit the ability to tender into an offer would be invalid:
the right to dispose of shares at a given price is essentially an individual right
to be exercised on individual decision and on which a majority . . .  is entitled
to prevail.120
Accordingly, the scope for defensive action to be compliant with the
default position provided by the improper purpose doctrine is unclear but
unlikely to be significant. In the recent case of Criterion Properties Plc v
Stratford Properties LLC,121 the Court of Appeal considered a case involving
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a takeover defence that did not interfere with the shareholder franchise. The
defence involved a put option in a joint venture agreement that would have
forced the target company to buy out a joint venture partner at an unfavourable
price. In this case the Court of Appeal refused to consider the general question
of whether defending against a predator could be a proper purpose. At best one
could say that the court clearly did not feel that this was an area on which
English law provided a clear position. In the space generated by uncertainty, in
the absence of Rule 21, one would expect to see takeover defences deployed by
companies and tested in the courts. However, as noted above, if English courts
adopted, against the weight of authority, the position in Cayne it is still unlikely
that companies would find many legitimate reasons for defensive action.
As the improper purpose doctrines restrictions only relate to actions whose
primary purpose is control-related, the absence of Rule 21 would encourage
companies to search for defences that have a defensive impact but which can
be characterized as non-defensive business decisions. This would exclude
pure defences, such as poison pill arrangements, but could cover available
asset-sale and recapitalization defences if it can be demonstrated that the
primary motivation was not a defensive one. As other commentators have
noted, however, where such actions are taken in a post-bid setting without a
credible record that the actions were contemplated prior to the bid, it may be
very difficult for the board to convince a court that the primary purpose was
not a defensive one.122 Furthermore, the easier availability of a derivative suit
for breach of duty introduced by the Companies Act 2006123 is likely to make
most boards wary of taking such action without strong evidentiary support for
the claim that the action was not defensively motivated.
C. Defence Potency in Practice
Thus far the article has considered the formal availability of takeover defences
and the ability of the board to deploy them in compliance with applicable
directors duties. Whilst it has been established that several defences would be
unavailable, it is clear that in the absence of Rule 21 shareholders could
provide the board with pre-bid formal authority to deploy certain tailored
defences, such as poison pills, or to use certain corporate powers, for example,
the power to sell assets, for defensive effect. Depending on the courts assess-
ment of the balance of power between the board and the shareholder body in
light of the defensive authority given to the board, the exercise of such powers
could be compliant with the directors duties. However, although formally
available and duty compliant, defences will only be used to the extent that they
are practically effective. If they do not in practice provide management with a
credible threat to prevent or delay a bid, their entrenchment effect will be
minimal, their usefulness in controlling the sale process and their relevance as
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a bargaining chip to extract a higher premium will be limited, and they will not
be used. This section considers in what ways, and to what extent, available
defences would be practically effective.
1. Poison pills
In the United States the most effective and readily available takeover defence
is the poison pill. The pill in theory allows the board to just say no, prevent-
ing the bidder from ever exceeding the ownership trigger threshold. The pills
defensive capability pivots on the refusal of the board to grant board approval
for the tender offer and to redeem the pill. Accordingly, if the board can be
replaced with bidder-friendly directors, then the pill could be redeemed and
the bid could proceed. Thus, the logical step for any hostile bidder would be
to commence a proxy contest at the same time as the offer was launched.
Although there are additional transaction costs associated with a proxy
contest, depending on deal size, these are normally not material. A proxy
contest involves the holding of a shareholder meeting where the removal of
the directors and appointment of new directors is proposed. Management and
the bidder compete to obtain proxies from existing shareholders to win the
shareholder vote. This shifts the regulatory focus away from the creative and
complex arrangements which make up the form and operation of the poison
pill onto the preconditions to a credible threat to replace the board.
There are several preconditions to a successful proxy contest and to the
ability credibly to threaten to bring such a contest. First, it must be possible to
remove a majority of the directors from the board. Ideally this can be done by
removing the directors during the course of their term. To do this it must be
possible under the applicable law to remove a director without cause, that is,
without any evidence of malfeasance.124 In addition, unless the bid is launched
shortly before the annual general meeting, the shareholders must be able to act
by consent, that is without a shareholder meeting, or it must be possible to call
an extraordinary general meeting in which the shareholders will vote on the
removal and appointment resolutions. If shareholders are empowered to call
an interim shareholder meeting and remove the board without cause the
potency of a pill is reduced to the time it takes successfully to complete a
proxy contest and the transaction costs associated with that contest.
US corporate law is state-based law and so the nature of these basic-rule
sets varies from state to state. Delaware General Corporation Law, for exam-
ple, provides that these basic rules addressing director removal, term of office,
the holding of shareholder meetings and control of the agenda are default
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rules. The default position is that directors are elected annually and may be
removed without cause.125 The company may, however, elect to have a stag-
gered board, whereby the directors have three-year terms and one third of the
directors terms expire each year. Where a company adopts a staggered board,
unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, directors may only
be removed with cause.126 The certificate of incorporation or by-laws may, but
need not, provide that the shareholders may call a special meeting (extraordi-
nary general meeting)127 although if the certificate contains a prohibition on
shareholders calling special meetings this cannot be amended by the by-
laws.128
Accordingly, Delaware law enables a target, in theory, to disable any cred-
ible proxy contest threat. If a Delaware corporation has a staggered board this
means that, against a determined incumbent board, the target would only be
able to obtain control of the target board following two AGMs. Even if the bid
is launched slightly before the first of these AGMs, the bidder will still have
to wait for at least a year to obtain control of the company. If a company does
not have a staggered board but does not allow shareholders to call interim
meetings then, depending on the timing of the bid, the bidder may have to wait
up to a year to launch a proxy contest.
One option which might occur to creative legal advisers would be to amend
the constitutional documents at the annual general meeting to provide for
without-cause removal, thereby effectively undermining the staggered board.
If the provision providing for the staggered board is set forth in the companys
by-laws, this would be possible. However, if the staggered board provision is
set forth in the certificate of incorporation, as it should be in any well-advised
corporation, then this would not be possible as under Delaware corporate law
the certificate of incorporation can only be amended with the approval of both
the board and the shareholders.129
The consensus position in the United States corporate academy is that
alone the poison pill is not an effective takeover defence which enables a
target to repel or just say no to a bidder. Its potency is dependent on the fact
that board removal and shareholder meeting regulation is default regulation
that can be moulded together with an existing or latent130 poison pill to create
significant defensive capability. For scholars who are concerned that
Delaware takeover law enables management to entrench themselves, their
focus of concern is not on the poison pill but on the default background rule
set. Professor Subramanian puts it as follows:
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129 Section 242(b) DGCL.
130 A poison pill can be put in place by the target after the bid has commenced (Unitrin v
American General Corp 651 A.2d 1361 (Delaware, 1995)).
No academic commentator today (including myself) questions the . . . right of a
target board to maintain a pill for a limited period of time, in order to identify a
higher value buyer or to inform shareholders about the bid.131
For these scholars, provided that the board does not have the ability to main-
tain defences for an unlimited period of time,132 then the pill should be avail-
able to provide management with sufficient time to find a better value third
party or a better value restructured bid and to enable an undistorted share-
holder vote133 on the offer.
Even where the board is not protected by a staggered board or shareholder
meeting provisions, removing the board is a significant step for shareholders
to take especially when the bid will not be commenced prior to the shareholder
vote or, where the bid is commenced contemporaneously, the bid is subject to
additional conditionality, for example, a material adverse change clause or an
acquisition threshold of greater than 50 per cent. Shareholders may be satis-
fied with existing managements performance and may be concerned that
should the bid fail they will be left with management who have a close rela-
tionship with one minority shareholder group, and are unknown and possibly
weaker than existing management. Shareholders with these concerns may
prefer that the board redeems the pill to allow the offer to proceed but remain
unwilling to remove the board. Such concerns increase the credibility of the
poison pill threat even without board removal protections.
An alternative and less drastic shareholder response to the boards refusal
to redeem the pill would be for the shareholder body to instruct the board to
redeem the pill through a by-law amendment. In most US jurisdictions, and
the presumptive position in Delaware,134 unless the certificate of incorpora-
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the board up to approximately a year, depending on when the bidder makes his intentions clear (L
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A separate vote on the deal through a proxy contest is not, however, subject to these tender pressures
(see Bebchuk (n 13)).
134 CF Richards and RJ Stearn, Shareholder By-Laws Requiring Boards of Directors to
Dismantle Rights Plans are Unlikely to Survive Scrutiny Under Delaware Law (1999) 54
Business Lawyer 607. In Oklahoma such resolutions have been held to be binding see
International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v Fleming Cos No CIV-96-1650-A (WD
Oklahoma, 1997).
tion provides otherwise such resolutions are not binding but are only preca-
tory. Any attempt to amend the certificate of incorporation to provide other-
wise comes up against the dual board and shareholder approval requirement
for certificate amendment.
The basic rule flexibility upon which the defensive potency of US poison
pills rests is not available in the UK. Accordingly, even if, in the hypothetical
absence of Rule 21, the poison pill defence is formally available, it makes little
practical sense to attempt to deploy one. The reason for this is that there is
limited scope for the board of directors of a UK company to protect them-
selves from removal or to delay any attempt to remove them. It is a mandatory
rule of UK company law that all directors regardless of their term in office can
be removed by a majority of the votes cast at the meeting.135 No reason or
cause has to be established to remove a director. It is also a mandatory rule that
the directors of a company shall convene an extraordinary general meeting
within 21 days of the receipt of a requisition to do so by members represent-
ing at least one-tenth of the paid-up voting share capital of the company.136 If
the board does not do so the members who made the requisition may call a
meeting themselves and have their reasonable expenses reimbursed by the
company.137 Accordingly, UK company law always enables shareholders to
meet outside of the AGM. If the meeting is brought to remove a director then
special notice is required, which means the company must receive notice of
the intention to remove the director 28 days before the meeting at which such
a resolution will be moved and the shareholders must receive notice of the
resolution at least 21 days before the meeting.138 Accordingly, where the
board refuses to call a requisitioned meeting an efficient hostile bidder can
remove a resistant board within 42 days.139 The board, however, could slightly
prolong this period by actually calling the meeting in accordance with the Act
on the 21st day following the requisition for a date 28 days after the date of
the notice convening the meeting.140 This would extend the removal period to
49 days. If the proxy context is commenced at the same time as the takeover
offer subject to pill redemption conditionality then the offer will only be 28
days longer than the shortest time frame within which an offer could be
completed and in fact will be similar in length to the time period it takes to
complete many takeovers.141
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141 Rule 30.1 Takeover Code (2006) requires that the offer document should normally be posted
If concern about removal of the board and subsequent bid failure under-
mined the likely success of the proxy contest, under UK company law the
shareholder body could simply instruct the board to redeem the pill. Currently
the default position under Article 70 of Table A provides that the powers of
the board to manage the company are subject to any direction given by special
resolution: 75 per cent of the shareholders voting at a general meeting. That is,
in contrast to most US state corporate law, shareholder directions are binding
not precatory. To the extent that such an option is foreclosed by tailored arti-
cles, direction can be given by the same proportion of votes by an amendment
to the articles by special resolution. For such resolutions 21 days notice is
required, which means that the minimum time period required to force a
redemption of the pill would be 42 days142 if the board failed to call a requi-
sitioned meeting and 49 days if they called a requisitioned meeting for a date
28 days after the date on which the meeting is convened.143 Accordingly, in
the UK in the absence of Rule 21 it would make no practical sense to develop
and deploy a poison pill.
2. Business combination defences
Business combination defences usually contain a board approval mechanism
that triggers the defence only in relation to bidders that cross the specified
ownership threshold without approval. This way the defence is only deployed
against unwelcome suitors. The act of refusing to approve a bidder would
amount to frustrating action prohibited by Rule 21. However, as with the
poison pill, even in the absence of Rule 21, this defence would be wholly inef-
fective in the UK due to the basic background rule set that allows the share-
holders to remove the board or instruct the board to resolve that the bidder is
an approved bidder.
3. Restructuring and asset sale defences
As we have seen, in the absence of Rule 21, the scope for a board of a UK
company to craft a restructuring or asset sale defence is restricted. Assuming
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ss 283 and 307 CA 2006.
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pill redemption resolution would remedy. Any shareholder who does not tender in the initial offer
has no concern about being left behind as a minority shareholder if the bid is successful nor any
significant concern about lost value as a result of later payment; he simply accepts the offer after
the initial successful offer closes.
that board action is compliant with the proper purpose doctrine, the board
could increase leverage and issue an interim dividend provided that there are
sufficient distributable profits, or sell assets of up to 25 per cent of company
value. It could not, without contemporaneous shareholder approval, issue a
substantial block of shares to a friendly third party,144 commence a share buy-
back or sell assets worth more than 25 per cent of company value. This does,
however, leave significant scope for defensive action. If the bidder is a highly
leveraged bidder, as is typical with a private equity bidder, increasing lever-
age and issuing an interim dividend could render the bid infeasible. Asset sales
of 25 per cent or less of the value of the company or the threat to negotiate
such sales could be a particularly effective defence against a break-up bid that
is premised on the idea that the company is worth less than the sum of its parts.
In such a case the defensive threat is simply to put the break-up process into
operation pre-bid in order to realize higher value for the shareholders. The
asset-sale threat is also available in the context of a bid that is not intending to
break up the company post-completion. The credibility of such a threat may,
depending on the circumstances, be constrained by the interdependence of the
assets whereby the sale of the prized asset would destroy value in the rest of
the companys business.
These defences could be used to offer the shareholder body an alternative
to the bid, as a bargaining chip with the bidder, or as a mechanism for obtain-
ing more time to control the sale process. They could also be used by manage-
ment to protect their jobs in the face of an excellent value offer. However,
there is good reason to doubt that in practice the available entrenchment effect
of these defences is significant in the UK. It is certainly less than it would be
in the United States. Management of a US company protected by a compliant
and staggered board145 can incur the wrath of shareholders by repelling a bid
and face no serious threat of subsequent removal in the short to medium term.
This is not the result of the collective action problem but rather a result of the
fact that it will take two proxy contests and over a year at least to obtain
control of the boardtime in which shareholders fury and focus is likely to
wane. In the UK a board that hypothetically deploys or threatens to deploy the
asset-sale defence to repel a premium bid has no such post-bid protection. The
board could, in theory, be removed within 49 days. The collective action prob-
lem provides a protective cushion for management, but the more self-inter-
ested the action appears the greater the likelihood that in collective outrage it
may be overcome.146 Furthermore, this different background rule set enhances
The UKs Takeover Defence Prohibition 295
144 Although formally it is possible that the shareholders could provide a pre-bid rolling large
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145 As of 1998 60 per cent of US publicly traded companies had staggered boards (Investor
Responsibility Research Center, Corporate Takeover Defenses (1998)).
146 See, eg, the proxy contest to remove the entire board of Tace PLC in 1992 organized by
Norwich Union. See generally, Black and Coffee (n 41) 20426.
the bargaining position of investors when they attempt to exert pressure for
change. In the UK such investors have an immediate and plausible big gun147
to back up their demands.148 In the United States, where a companys board is
effectively staggered, pressure is not backed up by the realistic possibility of
sanction. In the post-Enron environment UK institutional investors have
demonstrated their increasing willingness to exert pressure when dissatisfied
with board behaviour over appointments,149 remuneration150 or strategy.151
Although it remains clear that the costs of activism prevent hands-on opera-
tional monitoring by institutional investors, these investors are willing to act
in relation to high profile discrete issues that are framed in terms of poor
governance or managerial self-interest. Using defences without a strong busi-
ness case which the shareholder body would view as legitimate would quickly
be framed in terms of entrenchment which could ignite institutional investor
activity. Furthermore, if defensive activity risks being framed in entrenchment
terms it necessarily risks damage to the managers reputation. Should she be
removed, her value in the job market will be much diminished. It would, there-
fore, be irrational for management to abuse their corporate power for incum-
bency purposes if the act of abuse both substantially increases the likelihood
of their removal and damages their reputation in the job market. In practice,
therefore, the entrenchment effect of the asset sale defence or the leveraged
interim dividend are significantly curbed by the UKs basic company law
rules, the potential for institutional investor activism, and the market in
managerial reputation.
III. JUSTIFYING LIMITS ON CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM
Section II demonstrates that if we posit the abolition of Rule 21 then, subject
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investors prepare for battle over bonus plans Financial Times (London, 19 Apr 2006)).
151 See Investors unite to confront Vodafone Financial Times (London, 10 June 2006); Vodafone
under pressure on strategy amid huge write-down Financial Times (London, 29 May 2006).
to leveraged interim dividends and less-than-25 per cent asset sales, there
would still be no post-bid ETDs available to the board of a UK target without
contemporaneous shareholder approval. Importantly, the dividend and asset-
sale exceptions are only available where prior to the bid the companys consti-
tution alters the default balance of power provided by the improper purpose
doctrine either explicitly by providing that corporate powers can be used for
defensive purposes or implicitly by providing for a tailored takeover defence,
such as a poison pill.152 Accordingly, the only post-bid director-controlled
ETDs that are blocked by Rule 21 alone are defences that a pre-bid share-
holder body would have elected to put in place. Recent US evidence that the
large majority of companies going public have potent complementary
defences suggests that, given the option, sophisticated UK shareholders, such
as private equity investors, who control a company prior to its initial public
offering (IPO), would elect to make such ETDs available to the board. Whilst
in the US institutional investors are vocal and active in their opposition to the
mid-steam adoption of takeover defences through charter amendment and the
adoption of poison pills without shareholder approval,153 they are involved in
both the buy and sell side154 of IPOs by companies with constitutions which
provide for staggered boards and prevent shareholders from calling a special
meeting or acting by consent. Of the 6000 US companies going public
between 1987 and 1999, 50 per cent had staggered boards. However, of those
going public in 1999, 82 per cent had staggered boards.155 In 1998 51.2 per
cent of companies going public prevented shareholders from calling interim
meetings.156
Much hand-wringing has taken place in US corporate academic circles
trying to explain this phenomenon.157 Is this evidence that potent defences are
value-maximizing or is the price of the shares subject to a discount to take
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155 Klausner (n 153) 7634.
156 Note, however, that the prohibition on calling an interim meeting is defensively less impor-
tant when directors can only be removed with cause, which is normally the case when the
company has a staggered board.
157 See Klausner (n 153) 76684.
account of the negative value effects of these defences?158 What is clear,
however, is that providing companies with defences is the preference of
sophisticated shareholders that retain a significant stake in the company.
Whilst non-shareholder value explanations of this have been proffered159 one
cannot discount the possibility that in some cases owners want to protect the
company from takeover to ensure that their remaining stake in the company is
not cashed out by a future bidder who offers a premium that does not reflect
the companys long-term value. Whether or not as an empirical matter this
turns out to be the case is irrelevant to the shareholders view and preference
at the time of the IPO. Any prohibition of shareholders contractual expression
of such preferences requires a persuasive rationale.160 This section evaluates
the available rationales.
A. Post-bid Votes and Shareholder Sovereignty
Proponents of the non-frustration principle could argue that it does not fore-
close using an available defence as any such defence can be implemented with
post-bid shareholder approval. This is unpersuasive. Requiring post-bid rather
than pre-bid approval can alter the effectiveness of the defence. With an asset-
sale defence, for example, in order for the defence to be credible the target
must be able to negotiate a sale with a third party interested in those assets.
Carrying out legal and financial due diligence on the assets as well as negoti-
ating their sale can be very costly. There are also reputation costs for a third-
party purchaser who fails to complete the purchase. Any third party
approached to consider the purchase of such assets will be wary of incurring
those costs when the target may well be using the third party simply to extract
a higher premium from the bidder. Concern about the costs of an unsuccess-
ful transaction will be heightened if a shareholder vote could veto the sale. A
potential third-party purchaser will be aware that even if the asset sale offers
better value for the particular asset, shareholders may still prefer to exit their
entire investment. Post-bid shareholder approval for an asset sale may well,
therefore, undermine the asset-sale defence. Accordingly, a post-bid share-
holder approval process does not provide a rationale for removing pre-bid
approval of a director-controlled post-bid asset-sale defence.
Proponents of the non-frustration principle view the principle as the logical
outcome of a commitment to shareholder sovereignty: shareholders decide
whether to sell their shares or whether or not to approve proposed defensive
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action.161 As the Winter Report puts it: shareholders should be able to decide
for themselves.162 This is misleading. Shareholders may rationally choose to
constrain future shareholder rights by providing for a different balance of
power between the board and the shareholders. Posit a small shareholder
group who own and actively control a close company. The shareholders elect
to take the company public and realize some of their capital gains but intend
to maintain a substantial holding in the company and to continue to be opera-
tionally active. They are concerned that new shareholders, no matter how
sophisticated, will not appreciate the long-term value of the company when
faced with a well-timed premium offer and realize that if such future share-
holders are inclined to accept an offer then they will not authorize post-bid
defensive action. A rational shareholder group with this concern would
provide the board with as much defensive capability as English law allows. If
this choice is not available because it is blocked by the non-frustration princi-
ple, shareholder sovereignty is undermined. In contrast, the sovereignty of
shareholders who purchase shares in a company where post-bid defensive
action is authorized ex-ante is unaffected if their opportunity to accept or
reject a bid is inhibited by board action; the price they paid took account of
this risk.
B. The Collective Action Problem
A second rationale for foreclosing this defensive flexibility is a paternalistic
one based around the potential for management to exploit the collective action
problem. The argument is that if this option is made available then inactive
shareholders who have poor financial incentives to pay attention to the
companys activities, including amending its constitution, may well approve
defensive flexibility without giving adequate consideration to its potential
negative effects during a future takeover bid. This contrasts with an approval
request during an actual bid, where an offer is likely to ignite shareholders
attention to the actual effects of a proposed defence. In the context of takeover
defences this is a weak argument. Even though institutional shareholders may
not have large enough holdings to be hands-on monitors of corporate action it
is clear that in relation to what are regarded as key governance or value issues
they actively mould corporate action.163 The most obvious example of this
behaviour in the UK is the Pre-emption Group that informally and effectively
restricts pre-emption right waivers.164 Evidence from the US also shows that
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once aware of the apparent negative implications of takeover defences institu-
tional shareholders can act to inhibit them. Witness, for example, the inability
of companies without staggered boards to try and obtain shareholder approval
for an amendment to the constitution to introduce one. Institutional share-
holder opposition has resulted in a sharp decline in the number of companies
requesting such approval.165 Given the widespread sense amongst UK
investor circles that takeover defences are value-destructive, one would expect
UK institutional shareholders to be similarly circumspect. Accordingly, even
if available, defensive mid-stream constitutional amendments are not subject
to a collective action problem.
There is, however, considerable scope for introducing such defences at the
IPO stage. As noted above, recent US evidence shows that most companies
going public contain ETDs including staggered boards. However, purchasing
shares in companies containing these defences does not generate the same
paternalistic fervour as mid-stream constitutional amendments. Shares are a
package of rights set forth in the constitutional documents. If you do not like
the rights you can elect not to buy or to buy at a discount to reflect what you
consider to be the value-negative rights. However, you can have no complaint
about buying the rights if, aware of the defences, you purchase without
discount166 or discount to take account of those rights. It could be the case that
investors do not pay attention to or fail to take account of such rights: that is,
in relation to certain provisions set forth in companies constitutions the capi-
tal markets are inefficient.167 But even if this is the case it is not clear why the
law should paternalistically protect investors who are perfectly capable of
reading about and understanding such rights at the time of purchase.
C. Agency and Incompetence Costs
A third justification for Rule 21 foreclosing the limited defensive flexibility
left open by English company law focuses on the effect that takeover defences
have on the operation of the market for corporate control, and the role of the
market for corporate control in restraining agency costs and what I shall call
incompetence costs.
Agency costs are the costs that shareholders bear as a result of the fact that
managers interests are not wholly aligned with shareholders interests.
Examples of these costs include, amongst others: the costs incurred as a result
of action that benefits managers at the shareholders expense, such as shirking,
self-dealing and excessive perquisites; the costs of attempting to align
managers interests with those of shareholders through remuneration; and the
costs incurred through monitoring to prevent self-interested behaviour.
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Incompetence costs are the costs that shareholders bear as a result of poor
management decisions untainted by self-interest. In theory the market for
corporate control can check both types of costs. Managers who use corporate
power to directly or indirectly benefit themselves or shirk and prioritize their
personal life over their professional obligations lower the value of the
company and its share price. This value delta represents an opportunity for
potential bidders and a threat to incumbent managements employment.
Incompetent management similarly lowers the value of the shares and repre-
sents an opportunity for potential bidders. A premium paid to shareholders
may, amongst others, represent a portion of this value delta. The market for
corporate control thereby both disincentivizes agency and incompetence costs
and ensures that existing shareholders do not bear the full extent of these costs.
According to this theory, the more active the market for corporate control the
less scope for agency costs and the lower the likelihood that incompetent
management survives. Anything that gets in the way of the market for corpo-
rate control activity, such as takeover defences, necessarily increases the scope
for unsanctioned agency and incompetence costs.168
In analysing this justification for the non-frustration principle we need to
understand the extent to which there is an agency cost or an incompetence cost
problem in the UK that is not controlled by other mechanisms; if these costs
are already controlled then the market for corporate control will be less signif-
icant or even superfluous in this regard. Furthermore, we need to understand
whether non-controlled agency or incompetence costs are likely to be of such
magnitude that they trigger a market for corporate control activity: do the
agency or incompetence cost savings of replacing management exceed the
transaction costs of taking over the firm?
In the UK the case has not been made that agency costs require the market
for corporate control to keep them in check. UK executive remuneration has
increased markedly over recent years and is increasingly reliant on performance-
based compensation.169 This in itself may be indicative of self-interested exec-
utive action although their value itself is in most cases immaterial when
compared to company value. As is well known, increasing performance-based
compensation may, however, be a more cost-effective way of ensuring that
corporate actions are not tainted with self-interest. The scope for management
to act in their own interests apart from directly or indirectly increasing remu-
neration and perquisites is limited in the UK. A strict duty of loyalty creates
limited scope for personal exploitation of opportunities that would be of inter-
est to the company without shareholder approval.170 Whilst the directors can
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enter into pre-disclosed self-dealing transactions with the company and keep
the proceeds therefrom,171 if such transactions involve the sale or purchase of
assets exceeding £100,000 in value they must be approved by the shareholder
body.172
In relation to incompetence costs, there are two roles which the market for
corporate control could play: first, improving competence; and second, replac-
ing failing management. Fear of losing ones job will not enable an individual
to exceed his capability constraint. However, individuals may fail to make the
most of their ability for reasons that do not fit within the label of shirking.
Incentives matter for getting the most out of management. There is, however,
no reason to think that the abstract possibility of a takeover bid is more likely
to maximize (within an individuals capacity constraint) competence than the
more immediate financial incentives of performance-related pay. With regard
to replacing failing management, there is evidence that in the UK boards will
act to replace failing management. This is particularly apparent in the most
poorly managed companies.173 The increasing independence of UK boards
following recent amendments to the Combined Code should enhance such
discipline.174 However, if performance is not viewed as poor enough for the
board to act or if the apparent independence of the board is subverted, there
remains, in theory, an important role for the market for corporate control to
play.
The moot question is whether existing agency and incompetence costs are
significant enough to trigger takeover activity and, if they are, whether the
control market in practice appears to be responsive to these costs. Recently
Blanaid Clarke has argued that most instances of self-dealing will not result
in a significant enough discount in the companys share price to justify the
substantial takeover premium that normally prevails.175 This echoes earlier
US work by John Coffee who concluded that the level of efficiency is either
not extreme enough to justify the necessary premium or so extreme as to
surpass the offerors level of risk aversion.176 Empirical evidence in the UK
is consistent with this position. Frank and Mayers study of 80 hostile bids in
the UK between 1985 and 1986 found that there was no evidence of either
high bid premiums or poor pre-bid performance when takeovers involve
managerial control changes. They concluded that the market for corporate
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control does not, therefore, function as a disciplinary device for poorly
performing companies.177
D. Value Destruction
If takeover defences destroy shareholder value then they externalize a cost on
the economy as a whole. Their prohibition is then viewed as a justifiable inter-
vention into the freedom of contract in the interests of maximizing social
welfare. On the other hand, if takeover defences make a positive contribution
to shareholder value then one would have to look elsewhere to rationalize their
prohibition. The US debate pivots around value: those opposed to defences
seek to demonstrate negative value implications; those in favour search for
indications of value creation. In assessing the value implications of defences
commentators have focused on: the reaction of capital markets to the adoption
of defences; the effect of defences on takeover activity; the return on capital
for rejected bids compared to the market as a whole; the operational perfor-
mance of companies with takeover defences; and the premiums received by
shareholders in companies with and without defences. Recently, Blanaid
Clarke in her review of the literature concludes that:
While the empirical evidence is often contradictory, the majority of evidence
would appear to support the hypothesis that defensive actions reduce shareholder
value and are best explained as a device for management entrenchment.178
This article submits that the literature does not provide any such clarity regard-
ing the relationship between value and takeover defences; there is no majority
position. John Coates has clearly demonstrated that much of the empirical
work on the value implications of takeover defences is deeply flawed.179 In
relation to event studies that attempt to isolate the value effects of poison pill
adoption on a companys share price,180 he concludes, among other things:
that the studies are inconsistent from study to study and inconsistent over time;
that they suffer from methodological problems in identifying the data set; that
earlier studies negative value findings may be a function of markets misesti-
mating the implications of what was then an innovative defence; that the stud-
ies fail to take account of the fact that a pill can be adopted at any time, so that
a company without a pill is no different defensively (ignoring the interaction
with other defences) than a company with a pill; and that the studies fail to
take account of how pills interact with other defences. In relation to event
studies of takeover defences included in the companys constitution, he
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concludes that the results are mixed and that insignificant results predominate.
More fundamentally, he observes that studying the value implications of these
defences makes little sense in an environment that permits poison pills that
thereby render these other defences of little consequence. In relation to pill and
charter amendment event studies he concludes that the problems he identifies
reduce the value of prior event studies to the vicinity of zero.181 The prin-
ciple mystery about event studies of takeover defences he submits, is how
researchers managed to find any results, or why anyone took those results seri-
ously.182 In relation to studies of takeover premiums, he notes that the stud-
ies looking at the relationship between pill adoption and takeover premiums
consistently demonstrate that those companies with pills obtain higher premi-
ums in subsequent bids. This is usually explained by the increased negotiating
power that such defences give the board. However, he argues that there is no
necessary causal connection between the pill and the increased premium. The
reason for this is that, as noted above, as a company can adopt a pill at any
time there is, in pill terms, no difference between a company with a pill and
one without a pill. In relation to market for corporate control activity, Coates
review of the evidence concludes that pills alone do not deter bids. More
recent work supports this assessment.183
Some support for the position that defences destroy value is found in
work looking at the effect of reorganization defences. Dann and DeAngelo
in a survey of hostile takeovers from 1962 to 1983 found significant nega-
tive stock market returns at the time a defensive restructuring was
announced.184 One would not, however, wish to place excessive weight on
these findings. The sample was small and the time period for analysing the
returns does not extend beyond the announcement date. Whilst the authors
conclude that their findings are consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis
they acknowledge that it is not the only possible explanation.185 Others have
argued that companies that adopt defences have poorer operating perfor-
mance.186 More recently, a study by Danielson and Karpoff found that
operating performance generally improves during the five-year period
following pill adoption which is inconsistent with the view that pills
degrade performance.187
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Subsequent work by Coates together with Bebchuk and Subramanian has
looked at whether pills in combination with an effective staggered board
(ESB)188 can effectively repel takeover bids and what impact resistance has on
shareholder value.189 They conclude that the ESBpill combination does
increase the chances of companies remaining independent. In their sample of
92 hostile bids, 60 per cent of the 45 companies with an ESB and a pill
remained independent compared to 34 per cent of targets without an ESB.190
Furthermore, they concluded that the returns of the companies who remained
independent as compared to companies sold to either the initial bidder or a
third party bidder were 36 per cent less in the short run (9 months) and 55 per
cent less in the long run (30 months).191 Their conclusions, however, are not
uncontroversial. Most importantly, opponents argue that the ESBpill combi-
nation creates a powerful bargaining chip that results in increased returns in
the more numerous friendly deals which dwarf lower returns for shareholders
in companies that deploy the defences to block a deal.192 Bebchuk, Coates and
Subramanian have attempted to counter this with limited empirical evidence
that friendly deals with ESBpill targets do not generate positive abnormal
returns.193 By the authors admission this empirical rebuttal is tentative given
the small sample size. More importantly, it is logically inconsistent:
It seems an impossible feat of logic to argue, on the one hand, that ESBs repre-
sent a serious impediment to the hostile bidder seeking to gain control over the
[incumbent directors] objections and are extremely potent as an antitakeover
device, while at the same time arguing that, on the other hand, boards are unable
to use this extremely potent force to extract a better price from any genuinely
interested suitor.194
Subramanian has attempted to rebut this argument arguing that in practice the
scope for target management to deploy this bargaining power may be limited
due to, for example, the existence of other similar purchase options for the
bidder or the absence of plausible other buyers.195 However, whilst
Subramanian demonstrates that these case-contingent factors can affect the
value range in which bargaining can take place, his analysis demonstrates
necessarily that there will be cases in which the bargaining range is broad and
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where the ESBpill bargaining power can be deployed. The overall value
implications of the ESBpill combination, therefore, remain unresolved.
The value debate in the United States, therefore, does not provide Rule 21
with a convincing existential rationale. It remains a moot point whether
takeover defences generate or destroy shareholder value. More problematic for
Rule 21 is that the limited US evidence of value destruction is either inapplic-
able or less relevant to the UK. Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanians evidence
that ESBpill combinations are value-decreasing does not travel to the UK. In
the UK staggered boards and with-cause removal of directors are not avail-
able, and this, as demonstrated above, substantially strips the pill of its
potency. Evidence that reorganization defences are value-decreasing should
also be viewed as context-specific. Several of the restructurings studied by
Dann and DeAngelo would not be available in the UK without ex-post share-
holder approval because they involved share issues and buy-backs, and dives-
tures and acquisitions that would have exceeded the UKs 25 per cent
threshold.196 Furthermore, as noted above, the possible removal threat post-
failed bid may well have been much lower in the US cases studied than it
would have been in the UK due to the existence in the subject firms of stag-
gered boards and with-cause removal. If, as Dann and DeAngelo suggest,
entrenchment does explain the negative returns in the reorganization cases
which they analyse, it is not clear that the different set of UK background rules
would not control any entrenchment temptation. Indeed it is very plausible that
in the UK legal environment any value-decreasing entrenchment effects of
ETDs are neutralized by the mandatory set of background rules, allowing
value-positive effects to dominate. Unfortunately this hypothesis is not
testable so long as Rule 21 is in force.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the contemporary company law setting in which UK public companies
operate, Rule 21 has a very limited impact. If the regulators policy goal is the
prohibition of post-bid board-controlled takeover defences deployed without
post-bid shareholder approval, it has practical effect only in relation to a
limited set of reorganization and asset sale defences and only where the
company has a constitutional settlement that allows the board to use corporate
powers to defensive effect. But as has been established, the same background
company law rules which would disable more potent defences such as poison
pills ensure that available defences would only be used where management
were convinced that the shareholder body, or at least the active members of the
shareholder body, accepted the legitimacy of such action, even if they would
prefer to accept the offer. Accordingly, in the absence of the non-frustration
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prohibition not only would post-bid, director-controlled ETDs require pre-bid
shareholder consent but when made available there is limited scope to use
them for entrenchment purposes. If this is the case Rule 21 struggles to ratio-
nalize its existence. This article has looked for but found no such rationale. In
the context of UK company law, the non-frustration rule is unnecessary and
without justification.
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